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INTRODUCTION

The legendary songwriter of the 20th century, Bob Dylan once said:
“you better start swimmin’ or you’ll sink like a stone [f]or the times they
are a-changin’.”1 Since these words were recorded in 1963, and
particularly in the age of the Internet of the last two decades, technology
has advanced in such drastic and surprising ways that it has often been
difficult to keep up with its growth.2 The pervasive and continuous
expansion of technology seems to impact nearly every aspect of daily life,
including copyright law and its enforcement. Predominantly with the
invention and advancement of the Internet, the ways in which consumers
are able to access copyrighted works have expanded and become much
easier. For authors of copyrighted works, however, the battle of trying to
protect their rights has become much more challenging in the digital and
Internet age. With the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
of 1998 (“DMCA”), Congress provided protection via safe harbor
provisions for Internet service providers (“ISP’s”) against claims of
secondary copyright infringement, unless the ISP’s had, what has become
known as “red-flag knowledge” of infringing acts.3 Red-flag knowledge
is defined statutorily as, “aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent.”4 The interpretation of what
constitutes red-flag knowledge is the subject of this Comment.
The United States government has always placed great value on
protecting the rights of authors in their works. However, the U.S.
government, through copyright legislation, seeks to protect not only the
interests of authors, but also innovation. The so-called Copyright Clause
of the U.S. Constitution more broadly states that the purpose of copyright
legislation is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”5 However, the Internet and
specifically, malignant infringers who use the Internet as their medium,
are straining the boundaries of copyright legislation’s ability to secure the
inherent rights of authors in their works while also encouraging the
dissemination of such works as Congress intended. After all, what good
is copyright protection if protected works cannot be distributed to the
1 BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’
(Columbia Records 1964).
2 Id.
3 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010).
4 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
5 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. (known as the Copyright Clause).
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public to enjoy, be inspired by and learn from? The Third Circuit noted
that “the purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and
productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of
information, to promote learning, culture and development.”6 However,
without effective copyright protection, and thus a means by which to hold
infringers liable, there can be no monetary nor legal incentive for authors
to create new works in order “to promote learning, culture and
development.”7
In the modern digital Internet age, infringement has modernized as
well, posing new legal issues that Congress and the courts have tried to
address. Confronted with the growth of the Internet and use of digital
technology, Congress updated the 1976 Copyright Act with several
amendments known cumulatively as the DMCA.8 The focus of this
Comment concerns the current circuit split that resulted when the Second
Circuit’s decision in Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC9 defined the
“red-flag knowledge” requirement much more narrowly than the Ninth
Circuit did in Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung.10 This Comment
proposes that Supreme Court and Congressional intervention is necessary
in order to restore the intended balance established by the Copyright Act
between the rights of authors to their works and the rights of the public to
those works by adopting a modified version of the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of “red-flag knowledge” under the DMCA.11
In order to understand how the courts came to their respective
decisions regarding “red-flag knowledge,” it is important to understand
the history behind the development of copyright law, both through
legislation and case law. The next section will focus on the legislative
history of modern copyright law as it pertains to this circuit split.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
“‘There must be some kind of way out of here’, said the joker to the
thief. ‘There’s too much confusion, I can’t get no relief.’”12 In order to
keep up with the changing times, Congress has updated and modified the
copyright statutes periodically throughout U.S. history. The 1909
Copyright Act was the precursor to copyright protection as it stands today;
6

Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986).
Id.
8 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010).
9 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).
10 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013).
11 Id. (referencing §512(c)(1)(B) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the
provision known colloquially as the “red-flag knowledge” requirement).
12 BOB DYLAN, All Along the Watchtower, on JOHN WESLEY HARDING (Columbia
Records 1967).
7
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prior to 1909, copyright laws were based off of England’s Statute of
Anne.13 Modern copyright law is codified in Title 17 of the U.S.
Constitution, commonly referred to as the 1976 Copyright Act (“the
Copyright Act”).14 There are two fundamental prerequisites for copyright
protection that a copyright holder must satisfy in order for their work to be
eligible for protection. “[C]opyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”15 The Copyright Act also created six exclusive rights of copyright
ownership that allow the author,
To do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicty;
(5) in the case of literary, musical dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomime, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly
by means of a digital audio transmission.16

Through all of these protections and exclusive rights, the ultimate
goal of the Copyright Act is “to promote learning, culture, and
development” by way of the useful arts, for the betterment of society.17
However, in order to promote this stated goal, it is fundamentally
necessary for the law and courts of this country to protect the rights of
authors of copyrightable works in order to incentivize the innovation and
creation of original works by authors.18 Otherwise, the public will begin
to see a decline in the production of original works of authorship without
legal guarantees that an author may reap the rewards from his original
work and be protected from piracy and infringement.19

13 The Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349 (1909) (amended by 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1976)) (referencing the Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 21 (Eng.)).
14 The 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
15 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) (emphasis added).
16 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (2002).
17 Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d at 1235.
18 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
19 See id.
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III. THE DMCA
“Come Senators, Congressmen please heed the call. Don’t stand in
the doorway, don’t block up the hall. For he that gets hurt, will be he who
has stalled. The battle outside raging will soon shake your windows and
rattle your walls. For the times they are a-changin’.”20 The DMCA was
enacted to “ensure[] that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to
improve and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will
expand.”21 Recognizing that this new digital age presented new problems,
Congress established additional protections for authors and safe harbors
for service providers to strike a balance between the two competing
interests.22 Section 512(c) of the DMCA provides several “safe harbor”
provisions. Service providers can use these provisions as an affirmative
defense to protect them from direct or secondary copyright infringement
liability stemming from the infringing acts of their users.23 Section 512(c)
of the DMCA provides that:
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.
(1) In general. A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief,
or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief,
for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a
user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by
or for the service provider, if the service provider—
(A)
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using
the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is
infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to
control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.24

The DMCA’s pronouncement that “[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d)
on . . . a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking
facts indicating infringing activity . . . ” is important because it means that
an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) is under no affirmative duty to seek
20

BOB DYLAN, supra note 2.
Venus Fashions, Inc. v. ContextLogic, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-907-J-39MCR, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 155748, at *36 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2017) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2
(1998)).
22 Id.
23 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010) (referring to the provisions of the statute).
24 Id.
21
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out infringers.25 However, the ISPs are required to maintain a notice-andtakedown system.26 This system affords copyright owners the ability to
notify the ISP of infringing activity on their sites. In order to be eligible
for the safe harbor provision, the ISP must act on the notice provided by
the copyright owner by taking down or removing the infringing material
from their site.27 Additionally, an ISP must be able to show that it qualifies
as a “service provider” as defined by § 512(k)(1).28 The statute defines
this term as “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for digital online communications, between or among points
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.”29
Secondary liability, on the other hand, is different from direct
liability and can occur in several different circumstances. As explained in
MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., “[o]ne infringes contributorily by
intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement . . . and
infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining
to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”30 While the Copyright Act does not
specifically mention secondary liability, principles of secondary liability
are rooted in common law doctrines and are well established in case law.
IV. HISTORY AND TIMELINE OF RELEVANT CASE LAW
A. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
One of the first and most important cases to involve issues of
secondary liability on the part of ISPs for the infringing acts of their users
was MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 2005.31 Grokster involved a suit initiated by various
copyright holders, including movie studios, record companies, songwriters
and music publishers (“MGM”) against a software distributor
(“Grokster”).32 The Court was asked to decide “under what circumstances
the distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is
liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties using the
product.”33

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2010).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2010).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2010).
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (2010).
545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 918-19.
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Grokster’s services were primarily used by individuals to share and
disseminate copyrighted music and movie files without permission.34
MGM alleged that Grokster “knowingly and intentionally distributed their
software to enable users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted in
violation of the Copyright Act.”35 Grokster actively monitored and kept
track of copyrighted songs that were available through its services, even
so much as allowing users to search for obviously copyrighted songs listed
on top charts.36 In fact, Grokster’s internal email suggested that they had
actual knowledge of infringing activity.37 Specifically, that its business
plan was intentionally targeted at servicing former Napster users to allow
them to continue the copyright infringing activities that led to the
shutdown of Napster.38
The District Court in the initial proceeding granted summary
judgement in favor of Grokster.39 The Court of Appeals affirmed, reading
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. as holding that
“distribution of a commercial product capable of substantial noninfringing uses could not give rise to [secondary] liability for infringement
unless the distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of
infringement and failed to act on that knowledge.”40 The Supreme Court
identified the issue as causing a tension between “the respective
[copyright] values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright
protection and promoting innovation in new communication technologies
by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement.”41 The
Court created what it called “the inducement rule,” ultimately holding that
“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement
by third parties.”42 The Court, in overturning the lower courts’ decisions,
noted that simple knowledge on the part of a service provider of a potential
infringing activity or even actual infringement taking place would be
insufficient to impose liability.43
34

See id.
MGM Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 921.
36 See id.
37 Id.
38 Id. (referencing “Napster”, a peer-to-peer sharing website that was a precursor to
“Grokster” and was intended to allow users to share copyrighted works with each other on
peer-to-peer networks without authorization from the copyright owners).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 927 (referencing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984)).
41 MGM Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 928.
42 Id. at 937.
43 See id. (short cite this)
35
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The Court was persuaded by three factors in ultimately finding that
the service provider in this case was secondarily liable for the infringing
acts of its users.44 First, the fact that the service provider made it known
that it was attempting to “satisfy a known source of demand for copyright
infringement” was telling.45 Second, the service provider made no effort
to develop tools or processes to monitor or reduce infringing activity on
its servers.46 Finally, the Court noted that the service providers made
money by selling advertisement space on its site; the more user traffic to
the site, the more ad money the companies received, thus demonstrating
an intent to promote use of its site without regard for illegal activity.47 The
Court made it clear that, “if liability for inducing infringement is
ultimately found . . . [it will be on the basis of] inferring a patently illegal
objective from statements and actions showing what that objective was.”48
As a result, the stage was set and the standard was established for which
activities would amount to secondary liability in the eyes of the Court.
B. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.
Next, the Viacom decision addressed the contours of the safe harbor
provision codified in the DMCA under § 512(c).49 Viacom set the
precedent (before Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC) in the Second
Circuit for what has become known as red-flag knowledge on the part of
service providers.50 The Second Circuit set out “to clarify the contours of
the safe harbor provision of the [DMCA] that limits the liability of online
service providers for copyright infringement that occurs ‘by reason of the
storage at the direction of a user of materials on a system or network
controlled or operated by the service provider.’”51 The Plaintiffs in the case
were a group of film studios, music publishers, television networks, etc.52
The Plaintiffs (“Viacom”) alleged that the Defendant (“YouTube”) was
both directly and secondarily liable for copyright infringement of their
works due to the public performance, display, and reproduction of
thousands of video clips containing copyrighted material.53

44

Id.
Id. at 939.
46 See id.
47 MGM Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 939.
48 Id. at 941.
49 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 19.
50 Id. at 32 (referencing Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir.
2016)).
51 Id. at 25 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010).
52 See id.
53 Id.
45
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The District Court reasoned that based upon the evidence submitted
by Viacom, “a jury could find that the defendants not only were generally
aware of, but welcomed, copyright-infringing material being placed on
their website.”54 The Second Circuit applied a de novo standard of review
as to whether YouTube could be eligible for safe harbor protection under
§ 512(c)(1)(A) of the DMCA.55 As previously stated, § 512(c)(1)(A)
affords safe harbor protection only if the service provider:
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material . . . .56

Specifically, upon acquiring actual or red-flag knowledge, the ISP
must remove the infringing material. 57 Therefore, there are specific
threshold requirements an ISP must meet in order to be eligible for safe
harbor protection from infringement liability. The vagueness of what
constitutes “actual knowledge” and red-flag knowledge within the statute
perpetuated the dispute in this case.58
Viacom argued that Congress’s use of the phrase “facts and
circumstances” in § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) demonstrated that it did not intend to
have a limited interpretation of red-flag knowledge as only being one
defined type of knowledge.59 Viacom contended that an interpretation of
red-flag knowledge that requires specific awareness of infringements
effectively renders the provision superfluous “because that provision
would be satisfied only when the ‘actual knowledge’ provision is also
satisfied.”60 Thus, Viacom argued that this red-flag provision “requires
less specificity than the actual knowledge provision[]” and thus allows for
secondary liability when the “facts and circumstances” of the case do not
amount to actual knowledge of infringing activity.61
The court, in rejecting Viacom’s argument, stated that such a specific
interpretation does not make the red-flag knowledge provision superfluous
because historically actual knowledge denotes subjective belief.62
Alternatively, “courts often invoke the language of ‘facts or
circumstances,’ which appears in [the red-flag provision], in discussing an
54

Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 19 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2010).
56 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2010).
57 See id.
58 Viacom, 676 F.3d 19.
59 Id. (referencing, § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) known as the “red-flag knowledge” requirement
provision).
60 Id. at 31.
61 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
62 See id.
55
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objective reasonableness standard.”63 Thus, the standard adopted by the
Viacom court was that, “the actual knowledge provision turns on whether
the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement,
while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively
aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement
‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”64 The court, in support of
its holding, referenced other court opinions with similar holdings stating,
“[w]e do not place the burden of determining whether [materials] are
actually illegal on a service provider” consequently emphasizing that only
awareness of “specific and identifiable instances of infringement will
disqualify a service provider from the safe harbor.”65
C. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC
UMG Recordings also addressed the issue of red-flag knowledge
under the DMCA’s safe harbor provision, in which the court affirmed the
district court’s decision that the service providers could indeed avail
themselves of the provision.66 The Plaintiffs (“UMG”), who are music
publishing companies, record labels, and copyright owners, appealed from
the grant of summary judgement in favor of the Defendants (“Veoh”) to
the Ninth Circuit, which reviewed the case de novo.67
Veoh was a service provider that “operate[d] a publicly accessible
website that enable[d] users to share videos with other users[]” that could
be viewed on the website or through a standalone software application.68
While Veoh did not charge its users to access its content, the company
derived its income from advertisements that were displayed along with the
video.69 Veoh also required its users to read and agree to its “Publisher
Terms and Conditions” which informs users that they were prohibited
from uploading or submitting any infringing material that they did not
have a license from the copyright owner to use.70 However, employees of
Veoh “[did] not review the user-submitted video, title or tags before the
video [was] made available.”71

63

Id. at 31 (See, e.g., Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31.
65 Viacom, 676 at 32 (quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC,
667 F.3d 1022, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011)).
66 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir.
2013) (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
67 See id.
68 Id. at 1011.
69 Id. at 1006.
70 Id. at 1011.
71 Id. at 1012.
64
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Veoh’s site contained millions of submitted videos, some of which
had been found to infringe the copyrights of various copyright owners,
including UMG and the other Plaintiffs.72 To combat the submissions of
infringing materials by its users, Veoh employed two different
technologies that worked to automatically stop copyright infringement
from occurring on its service.73 One of these technologies was called
“hash filtering” which “disable[d] access to an infringing video . . . [and]
automatically disable[d] access to any identical videos and block[ed] any
subsequently submitted duplicates.”74 The other automatic technology
Veoh employed was a third-party filtering system that “[took] audio
fingerprints from video files and compare[d] them to a database of
copyrighted content . . . [when] a user attempt[ed] to upload a video that
matche[d] a fingerprint from [the database], the video never [became]
available for viewing.”75 In order to comply with copyright laws, Veoh
also implemented a company policy of removing user accounts that
repeatedly uploaded infringing material.76
Despite these precautions, when Veoh applied the filter to its
backlog, 60,000 videos had to be removed for containing infringing
material.77 UMG alleged that Veoh was liable for “direct, vicarious and
contributory copyright infringement, and for inducement of
infringement
. . . [and] that Veoh’s efforts to prevent copyright
infringement on its system were too little too late.”78 UMG also alleged
that Veoh “harbored infringing material for its own benefit” and took
minimal efforts to prevent users from submitting, downloading and
accessing infringing material.79 UMG argued that Veoh did not qualify
for safe harbor protection because it failed to meet three of the statutory
requirements under § 512(c), including both the actual knowledge and socalled red-flag knowledge requirements.80 Specifically, UMG contended
that “genuine issues of fact remain about whether Veoh had actual
knowledge of infringement, or was ‘aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity [wa]s apparent.’”81 Regarding the district court’s
decision that Veoh did not have red-flag knowledge, UMG’s appeal

72

UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d 1006.
See id.
74 Id. at 1012.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1006.
77 Id., at 1013.
78 UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1013 (internal quotations omitted).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1013 (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (known as the actual
knowledge requirement and so-called “red-flag” knowledge requirement)).
81 Id. at 1015 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)).
73
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claimed that the court erred by “setting too stringent a standard for what
[the court] termed ‘red flag’ [knowledge].”82
Evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Veoh hosted a large
amount of content for which it did not have a license, and therefore UMG
argued that Veoh should have known “this content was unauthorized,
given its general knowledge that its services could be used to post
infringing material” and that constituted red-flag knowledge of
infringement on Veoh’s behalf.83 However, the Court rejected UMG’s
claim because there were in fact many videos with copyrightable content
that could legally be displayed on Veoh’s site for which they had obtained
the necessary license from the copyright owners.84 The court stated that if
it were to accept that “merely hosting material that falls within a category
of content capable of copyright protection, with general knowledge that
one’s services could be used to share unauthorized [content], was
sufficient to impute knowledge to service providers,” the safe harbor
provision would be useless and no service provider could be eligible.85 In
support of this finding, the court quoted its holding in A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, that “‘absent any specific information which identifies
infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.’”86
The court also reasoned that the district court’s holding that specific
knowledge is needed to find a service provider ineligible for the safe
harbor provision made sense “in the context of the DMCA, which
Congress enacted to foster cooperation among copyright holders and
service providers in dealing with infringement on the Internet.”87 In
accordance with this stated legislative objective, the court found that
because copyright owners know exactly which works they own, they are
actually in a better position to pinpoint infringing copies on a service
provider’s network.88 The court emphasized that “Congress made a
considered policy determination that the ‘DMCA notification procedures
[would] place the burden of policing copyright infringement – identifying
the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting
infringement – squarely on the owners of copyright,’” and the Court
Id. at 1020. This is where the term “red-flag” comes from when referring to the
knowledge needed under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
83 Id. at 1021.
84 UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1021.
85 Id. at 1021.
86 Id. (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir.
2001)).
87 Id. (See, S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998)).
88 Id. at 1022.
82
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declined to shift that burden to the service providers.89 The court
ultimately held that Veoh’s general knowledge that copyrighted material
was present on its servers and that those servers could be used for illicit
infringing activity was insufficient for a finding of red-flag knowledge.90
The UMG court did recognize and agreed with the premise from
Viacom that there is a definitive distinction between what constitutes
actual knowledge and red-flag knowledge.91 In addressing the sufficiency
of UMG’s evidence that Veoh had been sent emails informing them of
documented infringements, the court stated that “[i]f this notification had
come from a third party, such as Veoh user, rather than from a copyright
holder, it might meet the red flag test because it specified particular
infringing material.”92 However, in order for a copyright holder to create
a genuine issue of material fact, as is required to withstand summary
judgment in a civil matter, the copyright holder must also produce
evidence that the ISP failed to “expeditiously [] remove, or disable access
to, the material.”93 In the end, UMG failed to establish that there was
sufficient evidence to disqualify Veoh from DMCA safe harbor protection,
in part because they were unable to meet the standard for a finding of redflag knowledge.94
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ANALYSIS
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion:
Finally, the circuit split at issue was created when the Ninth Circuit
and the Second Circuit each took drastically different approaches to the
question of what constitutes red-flag knowledge. At the outset, it is helpful
to analyze the older of the two cases that comprise one side of the relevant
circuit split. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit decided Columbia Pictures Indus.
v. Fung. 95 Defendant Gary Fung and his company isoHunt Web
Technologies, Inc. (collectively “Fung”) appealed a district court decision
in which the court granted the Plaintiff’s (“Columbia Pictures”) summary
judgment motion and found Fung liable for contributory infringement and

89

Id. (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007)).
UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d 1023.
91 Id. at 1025-26; see Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012)
(setting forth the original subjective and objective standards for a finding of both actual
knowledge and “red-flag knowledge”).
92 Id. at 1025.
93 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)); see also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
94 Id. at 1018.
95 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013).
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inducing others to infringe Columbia Pictures’ copyrighted material.96 The
district court also held that none of the safe harbors in section 512 of the
DMCA were applicable in the case.97 The Plaintiffs were comprised of
various film studios who owned the copyrights to many of the videos and
movies that were provided for streaming purposes on Fung’s websites.98
Columbia Pictures alleged in its amended complaint that “Fung was
liable for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement, in violation
of [The 1976 Copyright Act].”99 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Columbia Pictures, holding that Fung was indeed
liable for his role in inducing others to participate in the infringement of
Columbia Pictures’ copyrighted works, thus constituting contributory
copyright infringement.100 The district court found that Fung was
ineligible to avail himself of the safe harbor provisions under § 512(c).101
The court subsequently issued a permanent injunction to prevent Fung
from knowingly engaging in or fostering infringing activities of specific
copyrighted works owned by Columbia Pictures.102 Fung was provided
with a list of movie titles that the injunction applied to including several
public domain works, such as The Jungle Book and Miracle on 34th
Street.103
In analyzing Fung’s affirmative defense as it relates to § 512(c), the
Ninth Circuit explained that the statute “covers not just the storage of
infringing material, but also infringing ‘activit[ies]’ that ‘us[e] the material
[stored] on the system or network.’”104 In this case, the infringing
activities associated with Fung – peer-to-peer exchanges of pirated
materials – relied on the torrents that were stored, operated and maintained
by Fung’s websites.105 The court explained that the “torrents [that were]
collected for storage by Fung’s websites themselves [as opposed to ones
uploaded by users] . . . would be at least facially eligible for the safe

96 Id. at 1023-24 (referencing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 122661, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009)).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1023-24.
99 Id. at 1029 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 106).
100 Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1029.
101 Id. at 1029-30 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c))(2010).
102 Id. at 1030.
103 Id. (these titles were in the public domain, because, although at one point they were
afforded copyright protection under the 1909 Copyright Act, the statutory copyright
protection had since expired and consequently the works were placed in the public
domain).
104 Id. at 1042 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)(2010); Id. at 1028 (The type of
stored material on a system or network that this quote referenced is commonly known as
“torrents,” as the court explains in the opinion).
105 Id. at 1024.
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harbor,” that is assuming that the other § 512(c) knowledge and
expeditious removal criteria were met.106
In UMG Recordings, the court restated its adoption of the Second
Circuit’s interpretation of the knowledge requirement in § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)
for a finding of red-flag knowledge as, “turn[ing] on whether the provider
was subjectively aware of the facts that would have made the specific
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”107 Fung
argued that because Columbia Pictures did not provide him with statutorily
required notice of infringing activities on his site, he lacked both actual
knowledge and red-flag knowledge.108 The explicit language of the statute
makes it clear that when notice of infringement provided to an ISP does
not comply with the statutory requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A), it “shall not
be considered . . . in determining whether a service provider has actual
knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent[].”109 However, the court found that it did not need to
determine the adequacy of the notice of infringing activities provided by
Columbia Pictures to Fung based upon other factors.110
Here, the court found that Fung indeed “had ‘red flag’ knowledge of
a broad range of infringing activity for reasons independent of any
notifications from Columbia, and therefore [was] ineligible for the
§ 512(c) safe harbor.”111 The record before the court contained numerous
instances of explicit evidence proving that Fung encouraged the users of
his site to upload and download certain copyrighted materials in an
infringing manner, assisted his users in seeking copyrighted materials to
view, and aided them in reproducing copyrighted works on DVDs.112 In
finding that Fung’s knowledge of such activity was sufficient to meet the
UMG Recordings standard for red-flag knowledge, the court reasoned
that:
[t]he material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it
would have been objectively obvious to a reasonable person that the material
solicited and assisted was both copyrighted and not licensed to random
members of the public, and that the induced use was therefore infringing. 113

The standard used by the court in holding that Fung had red-flag
knowledge assumes that the “objectively obvious to a reasonable person”
standard can be met when someone is aware of material present on a server
106

Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1042–43 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (referencing
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013)).
108 Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1043.
109 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (2010).
110 Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1043.
111 Id. (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)’s “red flag knowledge” requirement).
112 Id. at 1035-36.
113 Id. at 1043.
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that is “sufficiently current and well-known.”114 By way of example, the
court referred to the presence of movies on Fung’s sites with titles such as
“Casino Royale,” concluding that it would be objectively obvious to a
reasonable person that the movies were copyrighted material.115
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit adopted an “objectively obvious” standard for
determining red-flag knowledge when an ISP is aware of “sufficiently
current, well-known” or famous works on their site.116
B. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC
In 2016, the Second Circuit took a position contrary to the Columbia
Pictures decision, which created a circuit split regarding the standard for
finding red-flag knowledge of infringing activity on the part of an ISP
under § 512(c).117 The Defendant (“Vimeo”) was an ISP “which
operate[d] a website on which members [could] post videos of their own
creation, which [were] then accessible to the public at large.”118 The
Plaintiffs (“Capitol Records”) were music publishing companies and
record labels that held copyrights for sound recordings of musical
performances.119 Capitol Records brought suit against Vimeo in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging
“that Vimeo [was] liable . . . for copyright infringement by reason of 199
videos posted to the Vimeo website, which contained allegedly infringing
musical recordings for which [Capitol Records] owned the rights.”120 In
relevant part, the district court refused to grant summary judgment to
either party with respect to certain videos because it concluded that there
was “a question of material fact whether Vimeo possessed so-called ‘redflag’ knowledge of circumstances that made infringement apparent.”121
The denial of summary judgement led to the interlocutory appeal.122
The relevant certified question on appeal was “[w]hether, under the
holding of Viacom, a service provider’s viewing of a user-generated video
containing all or virtually all of a recognizable, copyrighted song may
establish ‘facts or circumstances’ giving rise to ‘red flag’ knowledge of
infringement.”123 As of 2012, Vimeo’s website contained over 31 million
114

Id.
Id. at 1029 (referencing CASINO ROYALE (Columbia Pictures 2006), which is a
recent, popular edition of the widely known James Bond 007 series).
116 Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1043.
117 Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).
118 Id. at 81.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 82.
122 Id.
123 Capitol Records, LLC, 826 F.3d at 87.
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videos with over 12 million registered users from all over the world.124
Every Vimeo user was required to create an account with the site, and,
depending on what type of account the user elects to sign up for, they may
have had to pay a subscription fee.125 However, any Internet user,
regardless of whether they had an account, could “view, download, and
copy videos posted on the website for free.”126 Vimeo also derived
revenue from advertisements that appeared on its site, and therefore it can
be inferred that the more viewers that visited the site, the more revenue
Vimeo received.127
This point is significant because “[u]nder
§ 512(c)(1)(B), a service provider loses protection under the safe harbor
if . . . the provider ‘receive[s] a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity” and accordingly courts have taken into account the fact
that when an ISP derives money from site traffic, it is evidence of their
willingness to allow infringing activity on the site.128
Vimeo allowed its users to post videos on its website without
“intervention or active involvement of Vimeo staff” and its employees
“[did] not watch or prescreen videos before they [were] made available on
the website.”129 However, every Vimeo user was required to read and
accept the site’s Terms of Service, which, among other things, required
users to possess the necessary rights and licenses for copyrighted works
and prohibited them from uploading infringing materials.130 Nonetheless,
users were able to upload infringing materials despite these rules.131
Vimeo had a “Community Team” that it employed to “curate
content . . . occasionally prepare commentary on a video, offer technical
assistance to users . . . and at times inspect videos suspected of violating
Vimeo’s policies.”.132 Several computer programs were also used by
Vimeo to assist the team in finding and removing videos that violated
Vimeo’s Terms of Service, and each selected video was then viewed by a
Vimeo employee.133 Additionally, users had the ability to “flag” videos
that they thought violated the Terms of Service.134 These flagged videos
were then brought to the attention of the Vimeo staff.135
124

Id. at 84.
Id.
126 Id. at 85.
127 Id.
128 Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1043 (referencing17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B)); see
also Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
129 Capitol Records, LLC, 826 F.3d at 84.
130 Id. at 84.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 85.
134 Id.
135 Capitol Records, LLC, 826 F.3d at 85.
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Capitol Records argument was that there was sufficient evidence on
the record for the district court to conclude on summary judgement that
the Vimeo staff and employees had sufficient notice to satisfy the red-flag
knowledge standard.136 While Capitol Records had previously sent Vimeo
notices of infringing videos, which Vimeo removed “expeditiously,” the
videos that were involved in this suit were never the subject of any of those
notices.137 Capitol Records presented transcripts of emails and Vimeo user
chats between users and Vimeo employees containing questions about
posting infringing content.138 When asked about posting infringing
materials, members of the Community Team said, “[w]e allow it” and
“[o]ff the record . . . [g]o ahead and post it . . . .”139 Capital Records
argued that the evidence showing this pattern of behavior and complicity
on the part of Vimeo should be sufficient to prove the awareness by Vimeo
of “facts and circumstances” as is required to find red-flag knowledge, but
the Second Circuit was not convinced.140
In analyzing Capitol Records’ claim that the evidence was sufficient
to show Vimeo had red-flag knowledge, the court relied on Viacom’s
“objectively obvious to a reasonable person” standard.141 In interpreting
this standard, the court stated that “[t]he hypothetical ‘reasonable person’
to whom infringement must be obvious is an ordinary person – not
endowed with specialized knowledge or expertise concerning music or the
laws of copyright.”.142 The court applied this standard in determining
whether evidence of an employee viewing a video with infringing material
constituted red-flag knowledge.143 This court held that:
[t]he mere fact that an employee of the service provider has viewed a video
posted by a user (absent specific information regarding how much of the
video the employee saw or the reason why it was viewed), and that the video
contains all or nearly all of a copyrighted song that is ‘recognizable’ would
be insufficient . . . to make infringement obvious to an ordinary reasonable
person, who is not an expert in music or the law of copyright. 144

This narrow interpretation by the court is in direct conflict with the
Ninth Circuit’s decision on the same issue, and thus creating the circuit
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Id.
Id.
138 Id. at 85-86.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 93.
141 Capitol Records, LLC, 826 F.3d at 93. (referencing the standard set by the court in
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012)).
142 Id.
143 See id. at 93-98.
144 Id. at 94 (emphasis in original).
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split as to the appropriate standard for determining what constitutes redflag knowledge.145
The court provided several reasons for its holding. First, the court
explained that the burdens of proof that each party must bear in such a
matter influenced the decision.146 Since an ISP’s entitlement to the safe
harbor provision under § 512(c) is an affirmative defense, if the defendant
raised the defense, it then established its eligibility.147 However, the court
found that “whether a service provider should be disqualified based on the
copyright owner’s accusation of misconduct . . . or [] acquiring actual or
red flag knowledge – the burden of proof more appropriately shifts to the
plaintiff.”148 The Second Circuit reasoned that to require a service
provider to know every time an employee discovers potentially infringing
material and expect that employee to be able to recognize infringing
material would “largely destroy the benefit of the safe harbor Congress
intended to create.”149
The court found that an employee’s viewing of a video containing
copyrightable material may be brief and alone should not be enough to
find red-flag knowledge.150 The court also reasoned that “the fact that
music is ‘recognizable . . . or even famous . . . is insufficient to
demonstrate that the music was in fact recognized by a hypothetical
ordinary individual who has no specialized knowledge of the field of
music.”151 Finally, in a similar vein, the court explained that those who
work for ISPs and who will encounter these materials, “cannot be assumed
to have expertise in the laws of copyright . . . . [n]or can every employee
of a service provider be automatically expected to know how likely . . . the
user who posted the material had authorization.”152 Therefore, the
standard the court ultimately established for a finding of red-flag
knowledge on the part of an ISP was that there must be “evidence
sufficient to carry their burden of proving that Vimeo personnel . . . knew
facts making that conclusion obvious to an ordinary person who had no
specialized knowledge of music or the laws of copyright.”153 This
standard set forth by the court effectively narrows down the circumstances
in which a court may find red-flag knowledge significantly from the
145

Compare Capitol Records, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, with, Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d
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standard set by Columbia Pictures.154 “So let us stop talkin’ falsely now[,]
the hour’s getting late”.155
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE SECOND
CIRCUIT’S STANDARD
The Supreme Court should adopt an interpretation of “red-flag”
knowledge under § 512(c) of the DMCA in a way that comports with the
Ninth Circuit’s standard.156 Such a ruling would provide copyright owners
the realistic ability to protect their statutorily enumerated rights from
infringement by users of “service providers” as the term is defined in the
DMCA.157
The biggest distinction between the Ninth and the Second Circuit’s
opinions in this context is that the Second Circuit’s opinion limits what
would constitute red-flag knowledge to such a fine set of circumstances.158
This interpretation effectively makes it impossible for any copyright
owner to prove that an ISP had such knowledge.159 On the other hand, the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion allows copyright owners the reasonable ability to
hold the ISP’s liable.160 This section will analyze why the Second Circuit’s
standard sets an unrealistically high bar for a copyright holder—as the
plaintiff in an infringement claim—to satisfy in order to prevail on that
claim.161 In addition, this section will set forth the reasons why the
Supreme Court should look to common-law tort principles, such as
negligence liability and respondeat superior to justify the broader
interpretation of red-flag knowledge provided by the Ninth Circuit.
Finally, a look at the interests of both copyright owners, whose works are
typically transmitted across digital platforms, and those of Internet service
providers, will demonstrate why the proper balance of these interests is
met by adopting the Ninth Circuit’s red-flag knowledge standard.
A. The Second Circuit’s Standard Sets an Unrealistically High Bar
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of what constitutes “red-flag”
knowledge under the DMCA sets a standard that is unrealistically high, a
standard which essentially no copyright owner would be able to satisfy,
154

See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Gary Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013).
DYLAN, Supra, note 13.
156 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2010) (known as The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998).
157 Id.
158 Compare Capitol Records, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, with, Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d
1020.
159 See Capitol Records, LLC, 826 F.3d at 78.
160 See Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1020.
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155

2018]

An Analysis of Red-Flag Knowledge Under the DMCA

337

thus rendering the safe harbor provision a catch-all.162 The safe harbor
provision under § 512(c) of the DMCA was intended to provide shelter
from liability for ISPs whose platforms were being abused by copyright
infringers against the wishes or without the knowledge of the ISP.163
Conversely, the requirements for safe harbor eligibility were intended to
prevent malignant ISPs who knowingly allowed, or even encouraged
copyright infringement on their platforms from availing themselves of the
provision.164 Congress intended to provide a means of recovery for
copyright owners and maintain the balance of interests between copyright
owners and Internet Service Providers (“ISP’s”) through the
implementation of the DMCA.165 However, the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of “red-flag” knowledge denies many copyright owners the
ability to obtain relief from infringement of their exclusive rights and
destroys that intended balance.166
Citing to Nimmer on Copyright, the Second Circuit in Capitol
Records stated that the burden of initially establishing entitlement to the
safe harbor provision rests on the defendant ISP.167 Once established,
however, the burden to prove actual or “red-flag” knowledge would then
shift back to the plaintiff.168 The court reasoned that in order to satisfy this
burden, it is not enough for a copyright owner to show that infringing
material appeared on the ISP’s site, or even that an employee saw all of
the copyrighted work.169 In order to satisfy the standard of proving that an
ISP was subjectively aware of “facts and circumstances” that would make
it objectively obvious to a reasonable person, the copyright owner must
demonstrate that the employee who viewed the material was an expert in
both the legal and music industries.170
The likelihood of a copyright owner, who is an outsider to an ISP and
likely has little to no knowledge about the employees of the ISP, would be
able to identify the one employee who viewed the infringing material and
has the expertise required to satisfy this burden is minimal at best. It defies
logic to require a copyright owner to prove that a specific employee at an
ISP had such extensive knowledge. In addition to being a very high
standard to meet, this burden is also extremely vague. To be an expert in
the legal field, must a person have gone to law school or have practiced as
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. (referencing the DMCA’s safe harbor provision under §512(c)).
Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.04(A)(1)(b) (2015).
Id.
Id.
See Capitol Records, LLC, 826 F.3d at 99.
Id. at 94–95 (referencing Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.04(A)(1)(d) (2015)).
Id. at 95.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 93-94
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an attorney for several years before joining the ISP? To be an expert in
music, must a person have a graduate degree in music theory or do they
qualify if they have played in a band for a few years? To hold copyright
owners to this standard works a disservice to the intent of Congress in
creating the safe harbor provision in the DMCA.171
Alternatively, the standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Columbia
Pictures, though not without its flaws, establishes a more realistic burden
for the copyright owner to prove their case.172 The Columbia Pictures
Court found that the Viacom requirement of a showing of subjective
awareness of “facts and circumstances” that would make it objectively
obvious to a reasonable person could be satisfied by a showing that “[t]he
material in question was sufficiently current and well-known” or
famous.173 This standard does not require or expect a “reasonable person”
to have expertise in both music/media and in law in order to recognize a
well-known, famous song or movie in an amateur video posted on an ISP’s
server.174 A less stringent standard such as the one enunciated by the Ninth
Circuit would afford copyright owners greater potential to carry their
burden in proving red-flag knowledge of infringing activity on the part of
ISPs. In practice, this standard would also conform to the legislative intent
in enacting the DMCA to strike a balance between the interests of
copyright owners and those of unknowing ISPs.175
Does an objectively reasonable person have to be an expert in either
music/media or law for it to be objectively obvious when they hear Katy
Perry’s song Firework or Eminem’s The Real Slim Shady that they are
listening to a copyrighted song?176 One would think that any objective
fact-finder would determine that these songs are “famous” or “sufficiently
current and well-known” if for no other reason than the fact that these
songs have sold millions of copies and are featured regularly in pop
culture.177 However, the Ninth Circuit’s standard is not perfect either.178
With a standard such as the one in Columbia Pictures, the question would
inevitably be raised as to what “famous” means or what constitutes

171 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010) (this section of the DMCA contains the safe harbor
provisions).
172 See Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1020.
173 Id. at 1043 (referencing Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
2012), which established the “subjectively obvious to an objectively reasonable person”
standard).
174 Id.
175 Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.04(A)(1)(b) (2015).
176 KATY PERRY, Firework, on TEENAGE DREAM (Capitol Records 2010); EMINEM, The
Real Slim Shady, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Interscope Records 2000).
177 See Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d 1020.
178 See id.
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“sufficiently current and well-known” material.179 The word “famous” as
defined by Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary means “widely known” or
“honored for achievement.”180 Such a definition does not present a
definitive test by which a fact-finder could determine that any piece of
copyrighted material was famous, in that it is objectively obvious to a
reasonable person. Therefore, a modified version of the Ninth Circuit
standard would truly comport with the legislative intent underlying the
DMCA.181
Another consideration that must be accounted for by the Supreme
Court is that of “fair use.”182 The principle of fair use is codified in the
Copyright Act and states that “the fair use of copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching . . . or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”183 The
purpose of fair use is to allow greater use of a copyrighted work that does
not impinge on the purpose or nature of the original copyrighted work and
does not use more of the work than is necessary.184 Therefore, if
copyrighted works that are made available on ISP servers qualify as fair
use, they are statutorily protected and must be given due recognition.
B. Common-Law Tort Principles of Negligence and Respondeat
Superior May Provide the Necessary Guidance for a Modified Standard
Courts have applied common-law tort principles such as duty and
breach of duty to non-tort cases, in an attempt to delineate bright-line rules
or standards to be applicable when abstract or vague principles are the only
guides.185 One test that may have application in determining the
appropriate standard for a finding of “red-flag” knowledge is the “Learned
Hand Test” or Cost-Benefit Analysis test outlined by Judge Learned Hand
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.186 In the tort context, the test
operates as follows: if the burden of adequate precautions is greater or
179
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Merriam-Webster.com,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/famous (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
181 See Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d 1020 (referencing the explanation of
Congressional intent as provided in the treatise, Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.04(A)(1)(b)
(2015)).
182 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
183 Id.
184 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
185 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (using the
classic tort principle of “respondeat superior” to hold the swap-meet manager
contributorily liable for the copyright infringing activities of one of the merchants under
its control).
186 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947).
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equal to the probability of an accident, times the gravity (cost) of liability,
then the necessary precautions to prevent such an injury are not
required.187 What this comment is suggesting is that the potential
application of a modified “Learned Hand Test” to determine the threshold
for red-flag knowledge under the DMCA.188 A modified “Learned Hand
Test” could look something like this: if the cost (either temporal or money)
of determining whether material posted on an ISP’s server infringes a
copyright is greater than or equal to the percentage (probability) of works
that are being infringed on the site, times the cost of liability on the ISP,
then a finding of red-flag knowledge cannot be made.189 Of course, some
alterations to this classic tort principle would be necessary in order for it
to be applicable in copyright infringement cases, but such a test may
provide the bright-line test that copyright law needs.
Another common-law tort principle that may provide clarity in
determining the existence of red-flag knowledge on the part of ISPs is
respondeat superior. The principle of respondeat superior is a way of
holding an actor vicariously or contributorily liable for the tortious acts of
another, specifically in the context of an employer-employee
relationship.190 Under this principle, a master (employer) can be held
responsible for the acts of their servant (employee) if such acts are
committed in the course of their employment.191 While this principle is
usually limited to the employer-employee context, once again a modified
version of this principle could be made applicable in the DMCA copyright
context. A modified version would need to provide courts with the ability
to justify holding ISPs liable for the acts of their employees who either
encourage or willfully ignore infringing activities. Under such a principle,
the courts, when confronted with evidence that an ISP’s employees or
users that are paid for their content uploads (which is common practice on
platforms such as YouTube and Vimeo) are uploading or permitting
knowing copyright violations, could use respondeat superior to find that
the ISP itself had red-flag knowledge.
C. The Balance of Interests Favor the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation
As previously stated, in enacting the DMCA, Congress intended to
strike a balance between the interests of copyright owners in protecting
their rights and the interests of ISPs in disseminating information to the
187
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public and advancing technology.192 There are various trends in the
Internet and copyright industries, such as the proliferation of Internet
piracy, which favors the necessity of the adoption of a standard of “redflag” knowledge that is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, rather
than that of the Second Circuit.
Copyright laws have been routinely altered and amended throughout
the Copyright Act’s history to keep up with the changing times and
development of technology. Evidence of these changes is clear from the
transformation of U.S. copyright law, which was inspired by England’s
Statute of Anne incorporated into the 1909 Copyright Act, then into the
1976 Copyright Act, and eventually the amendment to the 1976 Act
including the DMCA was crafted.193 Perhaps the time has come once
again for legislative intervention to add a provision to the DMCA that
states a bright-line rule for determining what constitutes “red-flag”
knowledge of infringing activity.
Another trend facing copyright jurisprudence and copyrightownership in general is the fact that many of these ISP platforms’ content
consists primarily of infringing material, as explained by the Grokster
Court.194 There is blatant statistical evidence of the pervasiveness of this
issue. However, under the Second Circuit’s interpretation of red-flag
knowledge, essentially no ISP would be found to have such knowledge,
depriving copyright owners of the relief they deserve.195 This is yet
another reason why a more moderate interpretation of red-flag knowledge,
such as the one set forth in the Ninth Circuit, is needed in order to provide
relief and comply with Congressional intent.196
Finally, the development of the digital media market, and hence the
development of Internet piracy almost brought the music industry to its
knees at the turn of the century. If nothing is legally done to dissuade
piracy from growing and threatening the rights of copyright owners in all
industries, the same catastrophe could occur again. The Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of red-flag knowledge provides a defense for copyright
owners to combat such threats, whereas the Second Circuit’s interpretation
leaves copyright owners defenseless against pervasive copyright
infringement on ISP servers.197 Increasingly, copyrighted works are being
192
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196 Columbia Pictures Indus., 710 F.3d 1020.
197 Compare Columbia Pictures Indus., 710 F.3d 1020, with, Capitol Records, LLC,
826 F.3d 78.
193

342

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 14:315

created and disseminated both legally and illegally via ISP servers. If
copyright piracy is allowed to go unchecked under the DMCA, it could
have a disastrous impact not only on the ability of copyright owners to
protect their exclusive rights, but it could challenge the very purpose of
the Copyright Act: to disseminate useful knowledge to the public. In order
to prevent this from occurring, a less stringent interpretation of what
constitutes red-flag knowledge is needed than the one set forth by the
Second Circuit.198 The Supreme Court of the United States should grant
certiorari on an appropriate case that raises a question as to what
constitutes red-flag knowledge and make a ruling on the matter that adopts
some variation of the Ninth Circuit’s standard.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Modern U.S. copyright law principles were established to allow
those authors that create an original work in a fixed medium to be able to
secure their rights in that work.199 In order to protect an author’s rights to
reproduce (copy) their work, create derivative works, distribute copies to
make a profit, perform the work publicly, display the work publicly, and
(in the case of a sound recording) perform a sound recording by means of
digital audio, enforcement in the appropriate cases must be a realistic
possibility.200
On the other hand, as the world continues to evolve into the digital
Internet age, increasingly more ISPs are going to emerge with legitimate
business aims, but which are easily exploited by copyright infringers. The
ability of these ISPs to shield themselves from undue liability is an
important interest that must be taken into account by the Supreme Court
as well. The Supreme Court should strike a balance between the interests
of copyright owners and those of service providers, which serves to also
promote the intent of Congress in enacting The Copyright Act of 1976 and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.201 The most effective way of
analyzing red-flag knowledge is by adopting a standard that enables
copyright holders to realistically hold liable ISPs that knowingly harbor
copyright infringers, without requiring copyright owners to show that the
ISP’s employees actually had expert knowledge of the legal field and
music/media industry. Copyright owners need protection and shelter from
the modern storm of increasingly pervasive infringers on the Internet; it is
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time for the Supreme Court and Congress to listen to Bob Dylan and say
to copyright owners: “Come in . . . I’ll give ya shelter from the storm.”202

202

1975).

BOB DYLAN, Shelter From The Storm, on BLOOD ON THE TRACKS (Columbia Pictures

